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Abstract
Dispassionate and sober, J. M. Coetzee’s prose is a space in which literary 
identities are continually unsettled, methodological subtleties both revealed 
and explored. Given these features, philosophers have described Coetzee’s 
style as “modernist realist”. In this paper, I discuss the relevance of  Coetzee’s 
use of  the split page in Diary of  a Bad Year, focusing on its role in undermining 
“ersatz ethical thought”. In the second part of  the paper, I develop a model 
for explaining Coetzee’s modernist realism. This model is situated within a 
broader, self-critical project that traces the significance of  my analysis for the 
form of  philosophical discourse.
Desapasionada y sobria, la prosa de J. M. Coetzee es un espacio en que las 
identidades literarias se muestran constantemente inestables y las sutilezas 
metodológicas se revelan y exploran. Partiendo de estas características, los 
filósofos han descrito el estilo de Coetzee como “realista modernista”. En este 
artículo discuto la relevancia del uso que hace Coetzee de la página dividida 
en Diary of  a Bad Year, prestando especial atención a cómo sirve para debi-
litar el “ersatz ethical thought”. En la segunda parte del artículo desarrollo 
un modelo para explicar el realismo modernista de Coetzee. Este modelo se 
emplaza en mi amplio proyecto crítico de análisis del significado de la forma 
en el discurso filosófico.
Keywords
Realist Modernism - John Coetzee - Diary of  a Bad Year - Substitution Ethical 
thought - The Ancient Quarrel
It’s fairly clear that all these fine tragedians trace their 
lineage back to Homer: they’re Homer’s students and 
disciples, ultimately. And this makes it difficult for me 
to say what I have to say, because I’ve had a kind of  
fascinated admiration for Homer ever since I was 
young. Still, we should value truth more than we value 
any person, so I’d better speak out.
Plato, Republic, 595b 
1.  From philosophy to literature – and back
It is widely known that moral philosophers and philosophers of  
aesthetics have long relied on examples from literature. Indeed, 
an ongoing conversation between a cluster of  contemporary 
philosophers and writers seems to indicate a modern lifting of  
the millennia-old ban, sanctioned by Plato, on the inclusion of  
literary writers in the philosophical republic. Relatively recent 
endeavours in philosophy and literature alike would seem to 
suggest that the two traditions have finally initiated a process of  
reconciliation1. As philosophers, though, we call for further sup-
1  Here I have in mind the following works in particular: C. DiamonD, Re-
alism and the Realistic Spirit, in The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the 
Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge MA 1991; iD., The Difficulty of  Reality and the 
Difficulty of  Literature, in A. Crary - S. Shieh (eds.), Reading Cavell. Routledge, 
London 2006; iD., Having a Rough Story About What Moral Philosophy Is, in J. Gib-
son - W. Huemer (eds.), The Literary Wittgenstein, Routledge, London 2004; 
S. mulhall, The Wounded Animal: J. M. Coetzee and the Difficulty of  Reality in Lit-
erature and Philosophy, Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford 2009; iD., 
The Self  and Its Shadows: A Book of  Essays on Individuality as Negation in Philosophy 
and the Arts, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013; M. nuSSbaum, Love’s Knowl-
edge, OUP, Oxford 1990; J. lear, A Case for Irony. The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass./London 2011; iD., Ethical 
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port for this claim, as well as further clarification on how this rec-
onciliation might be achieved. Thus the importance of  a new 
gathering of  writers and philosophers, who transition between 
the two strands of  this dialogue: from philosophy to literature, 
and then back again. Recent work in both fields illustrates this 
point: Stephen Mulhall’s The Wounded Animal (2009) discuss-
es both J. M. Coetzee’s and (the fictional) Elizabeth Costello’s 
projects, describing them as manifestations of  a long-standing 
modernistic reflection on the conditions of  literary formal real-
ism; Coetzee’s The Childhood of  Jesus (2013)2 neatly returns to the 
ancient philosophical dispute over the existence of  universals. 
What motivates this conversation, if  indeed it is a conversation?
 Having selected one thread from each direction of  this dia-
logue, I aim in this paper both to uncover the rationale behind 
Coetzee’s use of  the split page in Diary of  a Bad Year3 and to 
consider the implications of  my own analysis for the practice of  
philosophical writing more generally, and so for my own con-
tribution to the discussion. In this way, the following does not 
merely identify significant points of  intersection between phi-
Thought and the Problem of  Communication: A Strategy for Reading Diary of  a Bad 
Year, in A. leiSt - P. Singer (eds.), J. M. Coetzee and Ethics, Columbia University 
Press, New York 2010; A. Crary, J. M. Coetzee, Moral Thinker, in J. M. Coetzee 
and Ethics; P. Singer - A. leiSt, Introduction to J. M. Coetzee and Ethics; J. M. Co-
etzee, Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons, Secker and Warburg, London 2003; iD., 
Inner Workings, Vintage, London 2008; S. Cavell, Companionable Thinking, in A. 
Crary (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of  Cora Diamond, MIT 
Press, Boston 2007.
2  J. M. Coetzee, The Childhood of Jesus, Harvill Secker, London 2013, 
159-160.
3  In the following, all references to this work are to the Penguin Books 
edition: J. M. Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year, Penguin Books, London 2008.
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losophy and literature. More than this, it performs the transfor-
mative shift in self-understanding, made possible by this very 
intersection that lies at the heart of  Coetzee’s novel. 
 The first part of  this paper discusses the philosophical rel-
evance of  a notion that will play a central role in my interpre-
tation of  Diary: the concept of  “substitution ethical thought”. 
The second part further explores Coetzee’s modernist realism 
and attempts, in a self-critical shift of  perspective, to apply these 
insights to questions about the form of  philosophical discourse. 
2. Diary of  a soul’s journey
Despite the vastness of  the South African author’s corpus, I 
have chosen to focus on Diary of  a Bad Year because of  the dis-
tinctiveness – relative both to Coetzee’s other works and to the 
genre as a whole – of  the novel’s unique formal composition. 
Here, Coetzee employs an unusual formal technique: each page 
is divided into two or three separate sections, each representing 
a different character’s perspective – a device that has an initially 
destabilizing effect on the reader. Thus the top section of  the 
page consists of  a series of  “opinion chronicles” (a collection 
originally entitled Strong Opinions) by an experienced South Af-
rican author, JC. The middle layer of  the page corresponds to 
JC’s private voice and offers a raw account of  his daily encoun-
ters with his Filipino typist, the young and beautiful Anya, who 
is assisting him in the composition of  his collection (commis-
sioned by a German publisher). The lower layer of  the page 
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corresponds to the private voices of  both Anya and Alan (the 
latter is Anya’s misogynistic partner). In the two lower layers of  
the text, Coetzee reveals the extent to which JC is both haunt-
ed by his impending death and somehow comforted by daily 
contact with a beautiful woman. A first encounter with this text 
thus brings the reader into contact with three private narrative 
voices (corresponding to JC, Anya and Alan), along with what 
might initially seem to be a fourth public, “quasi-technical” nar-
rative voice, represented by JC’s political opinions. This multi-
ple structure provides a modernistic framing for Strong Opinions 
(we shall return to this idea in what follows). 
 Questions about the relationship between stylistic devices 
– such as the split page – and the ethical ideas conveyed by 
a given novel can, of  course, be situated within more gener-
al philosophical accounts of  the impact of  literary style (how a 
given position is articulated) on the statements being expressed. 
In this context, we encounter philosophers – many of  whom 
mirror the history of  tensions within their own discipline – who 
struggle theoretically with (what is apparently) the same issue. A 
classic example of  philosophical reflection on the significance 
of  the style-content dichotomy, both in literature and philosophy, 
is Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge (1990),4 the introduction 
to which contains the following: 
The “ancient quarrel between the Poets and the Philos-
ophers”, as Plato’s Republic […] calls it, could be called 
a quarrel only because it was about a single subject. 
4  See M. nuSSbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990.
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The subject was human life and how to live it. And the 
quarrel was a quarrel about literary form, as well as 
about ethical content, about literary forms understood 
as committed to certain ethical priorities […]. Forms 
of  writing were not seen as vessels into which different 
contents could be indifferently poured; form was itself  a 
statement, a content.  (Nussbaum, 1990: 15)
On deeper analysis, Nussbaum’s claim reveals itself  as twofold: 
both in the philosophical text or essay (where literary style, the 
way content is conveyed, is often sacrificed in favour of  substan-
tial theoretical claims) and in the literary piece (where concern 
with form can reach such heights that content becomes impen-
etrable – arguably more so when one turns to modernist proj-
ects), style is an “assertion of  content” in itself. But, as we shall 
see below, Nussbaum is far from being alone in maintaining this 
position in the current philosophical landscape. 
 Because I have chosen to begin with a literary text, I will 
first concentrate on the second part of  the claim quoted above 
and say that Diary’s prose, and in particular its formal structure, is a 
remarkable example of  how the successful expression of  propo-
sitional content is genuinely inseparable from matters of  form. 
Coetzee’s text reveals that “[literary] form is itself  a statement, 
a content”, such that formal composition is really a means of  
asserting, of  putting forward, propositional claims. But the con-
tent conveyed by the literary form of  Diary isn’t merely “right-
ly-shaped matter”, a casually well-accomplished combination of  
compositional technique and the thought expressed by that lit-
erary framing. Rather, I will claim, Coetzee manages to convey 
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ethical thought by staging a direct simulation of  ethical thought, 
precisely because this simulation is presented in a register very 
close to his own. The result of  the simulation is a collection of  
opinions (JC’s Strong Opinions) that is aesthetically maimed, theo-
retically convincing, and completely sterile, from a practical point of  
view – notions that will be developed in what follows. 
 At this point, two questions present themselves as interre-
lated: (1) what does it mean to argue that the structure of  Diary 
conveys ethical thought? And (2) how does the novel do this 
without slipping into what I will be referring to as “ersatz ethical 
thought”, precisely by staging a version of  this kind of  displace-
ment?  
 Some philosophers (see Jonathan Lear, 2010)5 have argued 
that it is easier for a well-trained novelist to notice and prevent 
the communication of  ersatz ethical thought than for a philos-
opher to do so – practiced as the latter is both in compressing 
philosophical questions into abstract, deductive systems of  rea-
soning and in crafting the ordered, linear texts characteristic of  
the discipline. For the sake of  better understanding the notion 
of  ersatz ethical thought, then, consider the following thought 
experiment, centred on the figure of  a philosopher who is trying 
5  In his essay “Ethical Thought and the Problem of  Communication”, Jo-
nathan lear writes about “a fashionable substitute for ethical thought” and 
Coetzee’s attempt to “defeat ersatz ethical posture”. After having explored at 
some length the dialectic of  these two ways of  attempting to convey ethical 
thought, Lear closes by stating that: “Even at this early stage, one can see in 
the form of  communication a strategy designed to defeat ersatz ethical thou-
ght” (lear, 2010: 74). I have borrowed that last phrase from him, adapting it 
to my own interpretation of  Coetzee’s novel.  
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to put forth an ethical claim. (In light of  what has already been 
said, you might further conceive of  JC as just such a philoso-
pher.) 
 Imagine that our philosopher wishes to communicate a cer-
tain idea: namely, that the most important truths about human 
psychology cannot be communicated or grasped by intellectual 
activity alone, since powerful emotions play an irreducible cog-
nitive role in self-understanding. If  he states this view in a writ-
ten form that expresses only intellectual activity and addresses 
itself  only to the reader’s intellect – as is usually the case in most 
philosophical essays, and is surely the case in Strong Opinions – 
we face the following question: Does the author really believe 
what his words seem to state? How can he avoid the charge of  
inconsistency? The philosopher may believe that the psycholog-
ical thesis itself  is not among the truths that must be grasped 
through emotional activity. Or he may believe that the thesis is 
among those truths, but remain indifferent as to whether or not 
the reader grasps it. Whatever the case, our example demon-
strates how easily and intuitively the paradox arises. By contrast, 
a writer aiming to convey the same idea can avoid the charge of  
inconsistency to the degree that he expresses its (merely) propo-
sitional content through the text’s formal features – such that the 
relevant claim about self-knowledge is revealed to the reader 
precisely via formal devices that allow for emotional engage-
ment (which is certainly not the case with regard to JC’s work). 
Such a writer can even directly display this conflict to the reader 
by incorporating philosophical discussion of  the relevant idea 
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into a broader literary work that ultimately illuminates the in-
consistencies associated with its purely intellectual expression 
taken in isolation. We shall see that Coetzee (unlike JC) per-
forms both moves in Diary. 
 Modern literary works like Coetzee’s Diary, then, seem to 
make this complicated unfolding possible: in allowing for the 
combination of  emotive and reflective material, they reveal the 
truth of  claims such as that outlined above, where an appeal to 
intellect alone is clearly insufficient. Crucially, they are able to 
reveal the inconsistency of  claims such as this by incorporating 
their philosophical formulation. (We shall see below how the 
very same effect can be accomplished in philosophical prose 
that expresses an awareness of  the sorts of  paradoxes associated 
with the psychological claim sketched above).
 Thus attention to the specific kind of  storytelling at work 
in a text like Diary both helps us to overcome the difficulties af-
fecting these sorts of  claims and reveals a strategy for answering 
questions (1) and (2). If  conveying ethical thought via writing 
involves providing some kind of  practical guidance as to how 
one should live, as well as guidance on how to read the text in 
question and appreciate its message, then we can say that Diary 
does both by incorporating a vision of  how one can fail in both 
regards, i.e. by calling the reader’s attention to how the expres-
sion of  genuine ethical thought in such a text can slip easily into 
the communication of  ersatz ethical thought, and by isolating 
and thus revealing a layer of  interpretation – a way of  reading 
the text – that is both tempting and inadequate. Ersatz ethical 
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thought is the mere simulation of  ethical thought – a substitu-
tion for genuine ethical thought, which, although intellectually 
graspable, does not actually make a practical difference in terms 
of  how we shape the world and behave. As Coetzee seems to 
imply, this is the form of  thought expressed in Strong Opinions and 
in JC’s stance towards his book and its readership. 
 With this brief  sketch of  the problem at hand, we can now 
begin to turn to another question raised by Coetzee’s method in 
Diary: how can a text convey genuine ethical thought as opposed 
to mere ersatz ethical thought? Is this at all possible? We shall 
see more clearly how, in Diary of  a Bad Year, Coetzee’s answer to 
this question hinges on the triadic structure of  the page and our 
confrontation with the book within the book, i.e. Strong Opinions, 
situated as it is within Diary. 
3. The writer’s writer and substitution ethical thought
It may be tempting to identify the author of  Strong Opinions with 
the author of  Diary of  a Bad Year. The ostensibly straightforward 
identification of  JC with John Coetzee is only partially accu-
rate, however, and more must be said on this point. In truth, 
the connection between JC and John Coetzee has highly elusive 
– and not merely stylistic – implications; it is no mere curiosity, 
reducible to self-indulgent vanity on Coetzee’s part. Indeed, the 
temptation to merge their identities is a result of  our having 
succumbed, in part, to ersatz ethical thought. 
 JC is an elderly South African writer, who has recently re-
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located to Australia. When asked by a German publisher, he 
agrees to record his opinions on some of  the most pressing is-
sues of  global society (terrorism, ethnic conflicts, global warm-
ing, animal rights, genetic experiments) in a collection of  essays. 
As JC confesses, the prospect is a welcome one: “An opportunity 
to grumble in public, an opportunity to take magic revenge on 
the world for declining to conform to my fantasies: how could I 
refuse?” (Coetzee, 2008: 33).
 Although it is tempting for readers to conflate JC and John 
Coetzee, there is something that sets the two apart unmistakably. 
JC is willing to publish his strong opinions on contemporary so-
cial issues just as they stand (parched theoretical fruits from a 
stage of  life of  decreasing vitality). John Coetzee is not willing 
to do so. The latter published his strong opinions alongside “soft 
opinions”: a “Second Diary” of  intimate notes on the everyday 
life of  a man sinking steadily toward decrepitude – some erotic, 
but most representing an almost always dull routine involving 
a series of  nuisances. This “Second Diary” is the text that oc-
cupies the lower layers of  Diary’s pages. John Coetzee tells us 
about JC, and it is only in doing so that he gives us access to his 
opinion essays. 
 The formal technique employed by Coetzee in Diary of  a 
Bad Year can be interpreted as a rhetorical manoeuvre that con-
fronts the reader with a challenge (a difficulty, one might say) 
and thereby manages to convey disparate contents, graspable 
only by “different parts of  the soul”6. The book Strong Opinions is 
6  See lear, 2010: 70.
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embedded in Diary of  a Bad Year; were it published in isolation, 
it would require a different kind of  focus from that which the 
reader brings to the latter. 
 The disparity between the type of  content articulated at the 
top of  the page in Strong Opinions, on the one hand, and JC’s, 
Anya’s and Alan’s notes on daily life, on the other, is sufficiently 
striking to induce a conflict for the reader, particularly when it 
comes to how she ought to assimilate what she reads. The fol-
lowing passages, for instance, reveal how and to what extent this 
is so:
 [Strong Opinions] One would like to retain some respect for 
any person who chooses death over dishonour, but in the case 
of  Islamist suicide bombers respect does not come easily when 
one sees how many of  them there are, and therefore (by a log-
ical step that may be badly flawed, that may simply express the 
old Western prejudice against the mass mentality of  the Other) 
how cheaply they must value life. In such a quandary, it may 
help to think of  suicide bombings as a response, of  a somehow 
despairing nature, against American (and Israeli) achievements 
in guiding technology far beyond the capacities of  their oppo-
nents. 
 [Private dialogue between Anya and JC]  Nothing like the feel of  
words coming into the world, he says, it is enough to make you 
shiver. I draw myself  up, make a prune mouth. You shouldn’t 
say things like that to a nice girl, Señor, I say. And I turn my 
back and off I go with a waggle of  the bum, his eyes avid upon 
me. I picked it up from the ducks, I think: a shake of  the tail so 
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quick it is almost a shiver. Quick-quack. (Coetzee, 2008: 39-40) 
Were we to read JC’s Strong Opinions on its own, approaching the 
broader work in which it is situated only horizontally, as it were, 
we would encounter a space of  argumentation. JC’s book, which 
John Coetzee refuses to present to us separately, addresses the 
rational part of  the soul almost exclusively. This approach relies 
on an affinity between sender and receiver, insofar as the rational 
part of  JC’s soul addresses the rational part of  the reader’s soul. 
(Obviously, this is an oversimplification; it is useful, however, 
when it comes to the issue of  methodology in interpreting Diary 
and Coetzee’s therapeutic role as writer and creator of  JC.) 
 If  we instead adopt a vertical reading of  the pages of  Diary 
of  a Bad Year, we come across what Jonathan Lear calls “a spec-
tacle of  embedding”.7 Relying on the plasticity of  this expres-
sion, Lear describes the heart of  the connection between the 
book’s page structure and Coetzee’s handling of  the stories of  
his main characters: if  we read the book vertically, we see how 
the compilation of  JC’s “strong opinions” is embedded in the 
presentation of  the fantasies and daily lives of  the three main 
characters. As we read down the page, we also move further into 
the lower part of  the soul (and even to the presentation of  lower 
parts of  the body: Anya’s body, JC’s body and Alan’s body). This 
“inferior” display of  aspects of  daily life is the separable (be-
cause useless) part of  a book of  “strong opinions” on contempo-
rary social and political issues from an ethical perspective. But it 
is not separable from the modernist realist book that John Coetzee 
7  See lear, 2010: 70.
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offers us. Strong Opinions is thus a realistic (pseudo) book written 
in the form and under the influence of  argument, but this form 
is only one aspect of  the organic unity of  form and matter em-
bodied by JC’s collection, embedded as it is in the episodes that 
make up his daily life. JC’s authority as a character influences 
the fundamental structure of  Diary; Coetzee has us actually read 
Strong Opinions and does not merely tell us about the process of  
its composition (which, were it so, would detract considerably 
from the novel’s effectiveness).    
 We must still examine in more detail and finally move beyond 
the more or less methodological and associative elements dis-
cussed until now if  we want to make clear how embedding JC’s 
strong moral opinions in descriptions of  private daily life pre-
vents the mere communication of  substitute ethical thought and 
instead promotes authentic ethical thought through the text’s 
destabilizing form. To do so, I will proceed as follows: 
a) I will examine how the compositional form of  Diary of  a Bad 
Year precludes what I have been calling ersatz ethical thought by 
incorporating a simulation of  this type of  thought; and 
b) I will analyse one of  the opinions in Strong Opinions, as a 
“case study” of  sorts, in order to obtain confirmation of  (a).
4. The substitution of  ersatz ethical thought
Let us look more closely at “ersatz ethical thought”. Once again, 
the underlying idea can most easily be expressed via consider-
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ation of  a thought experiment. 
Let us imagine that a respectable academic – a professor of  con-
temporary ethics at Yale, for instance – spends one semester at 
Yale and another semester at a foreign university. Let us also 
imagine that our distinguished academic has a teaching com-
mitment that makes it necessary for him to commute between 
Europe and the United States. This distinguished academic 
dedicates his professional life to writing technical articles, opin-
ion columns and conference presentations on “contemporary 
ethical issues” (we can imagine that one of  these articles even 
bears the title “Modernist Realism and its Enemies: John Co-
etzee and Philosophy”). University professors are usually well 
paid, both in Europe and in America, and our notable academ-
ic is no exception. Committed to writing specialized articles, 
opinion columns and encyclopaedia entries on subjects such as 
global warming, animal rights, gender-based violence, the Mid-
dle East, paedophilia, the sale of  nuclear weapons to Iran, or 
ersatz ethical thought, our distinguished academic has grown 
accustomed to accepting things as they stand in a globalized 
world and in the social contexts in which he engages – whilst 
also taking advantage of  his prestige and intellectual influence.
The sort of  work carried out by our notable academic – who 
is surely too realistic to have been made up – could be consid-
ered one instance of  ersatz ethical thought, especially insofar as 
its (alleged) ethical content is conveyed as mere information (just 
like Strong Opinions and, possibly, this essay) without any need for 
emotional involvement.
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With this example in hand, let us return to Diary. When narrat-
ing first-hand experiences of  barbaric situations, John Coetzee’s 
tone tends to be unsettlingly apathetic. Yet, as we shall see, it 
is precisely this narrative style that provides an antidote to any 
conceivable form of  substitute ethical thought. Diary portrays 
something that is itself  an ethical issue – the intrusion of  forms 
of  ersatz ethical thought into a literary work that aims to con-
vey ethical content. Mostly by way of  the inclusion of  Strong 
Opinions, Coetzee’s technique allows him to show how difficult it 
is for a literary text – one meant to convey ethical thought – to 
avoid becoming a vehicle for ersatz ethical thought (such as an 
opinion chronicle, for example). JC falls into this very trap, and 
he is “a prestigious South African writer”. What guarantee do 
we have that John Coetzee will not do the same?
Coetzee’s body of  work as a whole incorporates a heavily 
self-referential component, which is conspicuous in his most re-
cent books. In addition to Diary, we find a remarkable self-ref-
erential strategy in Summertime (2009)8, where the author em-
ploys another technique to replace substitution ethical thought. 
Whereas the technique for preventing ersatz ethical thought in 
Diary is mostly based on the triadic narrative voice – with the 
nuances and degrees of  formality I have analysed thus far – the 
relevant technique in Summertime is its post-mortem structure. 
The writer John Coetzee has recently died, and the whole book, 
whose starting point is this very fact, is a collection of  personal 
accounts of  his life, as related by different narrators (including a 
8  See J. M. Coetzee, Summertime, Vintage, London 2009.
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former lover, a neighbour, and the mother of  a former student 
in Cape Town). 
Insofar as the (potentially dangerous) self-referential literary 
techniques vastly and variously employed in his books are one 
of  Coetzee’s assets in defeating ersatz ethical thought, and in-
sofar as defeating it matters at least as much to us as finding 
out how such a defeat might be accomplished, in both litera-
ture and philosophy, I shall concentrate on the details of  these 
techniques in Coetzee’s novels, later applying the results to my 
own philosophical inquiries. Having already explored one such 
manoeuvre – the complex overlapping of  the personal identities 
of  Coetzee and JC – we shall now turn to another: JC’s com-
mitment to specific political views that are easily attributable to 
John Coetzee. 
5. The dialectic of  responsibility
In the “spectacle of  embedding” that is Diary of  a Bad Year, a 
reflection entitled “On National Shame” is included as a section 
of  JC’s book, Strong Opinions. In this section, JC is credited with 
having written the following:
An article in a recent New Yorker makes it plain as day that the 
US administration, with the lead taken by Richard Cheney, not 
only sanctions the torture of  prisoners taken in the so-called 
war on terror but is active in every way to subvert laws and con-
ventions proscribing torture. […] Their shamelessness is quite 
extraordinary. Their denials are less than half-hearted. The dis-
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tinction their hired lawyers draw between torture and coercion 
is patently insincere, pro forma. In the new dispensation we have 
created, they implicitly say, the old powers of  shame have been 
abolished. Whatever abhorrence you may feel counts for noth-
ing. You cannot touch us, we are too powerful.
Demosthenes: Whereas the slave fears only pain, what the free 
man fears most is shame. If  we grant the truth of  what the New 
Yorker claims, then the issue for individual Americans becomes a 
moral one: how, in the face of  this shame to which I am sub-
jected, do I behave? How do I save my honour? […] Dishonour 
is no respecter of  fine distinctions. Dishonour descends upon 
one’s shoulders, and once it has descended no amount of  clever 
pleading will dispel it. (Coetzee, 2008: 48-59)
The aim of  this reflection (both JC’s and my own in this paper) 
is to inquire into how the relevant “moral issue” can be artic-
ulated by means of  what I – following Jonathan Lear – have 
called the “dialectic of  responsibility”. Within JC’s Strong Opin-
ions itself, there is a sort of  “division of  explanatory labour” at 
work between a broader theoretical position (a view on national 
shame) and the illustration of  that position (examples of  torture) 
in “On National Shame”. Furthermore, to the extent that we 
are familiar with Coetzee’s work (his fiction and his essays) and 
thus acquainted with some of  his own public views on interna-
tional politics, we could easily ascribe this stance on American 
governmental decrees related to the so-called post-9/11 “war 
on terror”, here apparently held by JC, to Coetzee himself. 
In the preceding section of  Strong Opinions, JC analyses a mor-
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al-political position held by Machiavelli in The Prince: the Neces-
sità. 
Necessity, Necessità, is Machiavelli’s guiding principle. The old, 
pre-Machiavellian position was that the moral law was supreme. 
If  it so happened that the moral law was sometimes broken, that 
was unfortunate, but rulers were merely human, after all. The 
new, Machiavellian position is that infringing the moral law is 
justified when it is necessary. Thus is inaugurated the dualism of  
modern political culture, which simultaneously upholds abso-
lute and relative standards of  value. The modern state appeals 
to morality, to religion, and to natural law as the ideological 
foundation of  its existence. At the same time it is prepared to 
infringe any or all of  these in the interest of  self-preservation. 
Machiavelli does not deny that the claims morality makes on us 
are absolute. At the same time he asserts that in the interest of  the state 
the ruler “is often obliged [necessitato] to act without loyalty, without mercy, 
without humanity, and without religion”.  (Coetzee, 2008: 26)9 
A suitable adaptation of  Machiavelli’s idea, here, is the notion 
that there is no such thing as national shame, let alone “shame 
assimilated by mere citizenship” – contrary to what JC con-
tends, though it is still he who includes a quotation from The 
Prince in Strong Opinions – because one must do whatever one 
must in order to protect and preserve the state. Yet an important 
social group, which JC calls “liberal intellectuals”, rejects both 
Machiavelli’s Necessità and the “assimilation of  shame by citizen-
ship” argued for by JC. Here, JC refers specifically to the Bush 
9  The passage in italics is from maChiavelli’s The Prince, Chap. XVIII.
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administration and to the behaviour and political views held by 
liberal intellectuals in post-9/11 American society, where these 
intellectuals aimed to distance themselves from both positions 
by means of  rational self-justification. This specific example rep-
resents a more generalizable ethical posture, however, in which 
personal responsibility is denied and blame shifted to another. 
The dialectic of  responsibility, aimed at deconstructing this pos-
ture for the reader of  both the book and the pseudo-book (Diary 
and Strong Opinions), will operate through my own interpretation 
of  JC’s argument for national shame in this section of  Strong 
Opinions, to which we now turn. This stance is easily attributable 
to Coetzee himself, and the following analysis aims in part to 
reveal the role that JC – himself  a fictional creation – plays with 
regard to the author of  Diary.  
JC describes the mechanism of  a self-justifying denial of  nation-
al shame as involving three steps: (1) the ascription of  shameful 
guilt to the political leaders of  the relevant country – i.e. US 
post-9/11 political leaders; (2) a massive distancing from the po-
sitions adopted and the actions carried out by these leaders; and 
(3) a rejection of  both moral dualism and the divide between 
theory and practice inherent in Machiavelli’s Necessità. 
Liberal intellectuals actively want to distance themselves from 
both the central idea of  Necessità and the attribution of  national 
shame, precisely because such positions implicate them. Howev-
er, there is something the liberal intellectual doesn’t see – mostly 
because he cannot see it – and this is the fact that shameful 
guilt descends like a curse and cannot be removed by argument. 
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Liberal intellectuals cannot recognize this phenomenon because 
they want to deny their involvement in national shame by way 
of  logical justification. 
At this point in JC’s strong opinion on national shame, the as-
tute reader of  Diary gradually realizes that JC is talking about 
and to the reader herself whenever he writes about “liberal intel-
lectuals”, describing their behaviour and the structure of  their 
stance in view of  this specific moral and political issue. And, at 
the same time that this manoeuvre is acknowledged, the reader 
is further reminded that JC is no more than a product of  Coet-
zee’s literary imagination. Although Coetzee gives us more than 
Strong Opinions, he offers it to us nonetheless, and so must be held 
accountable for whatever positions are defended therein – even 
if  he sometimes feels tempted to decry JC’s decrepitude and 
misogyny and never completely identifies himself  with his al-
ter-ego (thus making things easier for him and harder for us). In 
spite of  the likely frustration caused by this device, the dialectic 
of  responsibility extends to the reader herself, who, after all, 
chose to take up the novel in the first place.   
 The dialectic of  responsibility can therefore be said to act 
upon the reader of  Diary of  a Bad Year via a mechanism of  iden-
tification. At the moment in Diary where the above quotation 
occurs, it is again Coetzee who wants to make us understand 
that there is something extremely inconsistent about the stance 
of  these “liberal intellectuals”. More specifically: how can 
“they” be opposed to both Machiavelli’s Necessità, as a positive 
stance, and the assimilation of  shame by citizenship, when both 
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positions represent contradictory yet complementary ideas that 
“exhaustively cover a domain of  intelligible positions”? The 
problem arises precisely because one must choose between the 
following options:
a) Either there is no such thing as national shame, because one 
must do whatever is needed to protect the interests of  the state 
(Necessità); or
b) National shame exists and does not pertain exclusively to 
political leaders, insofar as it spreads via non-rational mecha-
nisms, its removal cannot be effected by rational justification, 
and these leaders were elected by the public. To accuse political 
leaders of  “shameful behaviour” is already to experience the curse of  
this shame. 
This inconsistency, however, belongs also to me – an astute, 
well-informed reader of  Diary of  a Bad Year. I am perfectly ca-
pable of  understanding the structural paths of  this inconsisten-
cy, and I can even detect the responsibility-divesting cynicism 
inherent in it, so long as I am able to rely on the scapegoat of  
the third person. It is “them”, of  which we speak, the so-called “liberal 
intellectuals”. 
 Only by means of  the formal use of  the third person to refer 
to this social group does Coetzee manage to convey his intended 
content in an effective way, removing the veil of  blindness that 
risks shielding the eyes of  the liberal intellectual reader. The 
dialectic of  responsibility is the reading process by which we 
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achieve the lifting of  this veil. 
 It is more than plausible to suppose that, upon finishing Di-
ary, one might come to view this formal strategy as a “formal 
subterfuge” and thus be left feeling naked and doubly deceived 
– for we do not like the position held by the liberal intellectuals, 
which isn’t actually “their” position, but rather ours, and we do 
not like the way Coetzee’s text pretends to tell us about an ab-
stract group of  people who can only stand for strong positions 
by being blind to their own point of  view, when actually it de-
scribes us. 
 The dialectic of  responsibility – this whole process – func-
tions as a bridge between the formal method of  writing and the act 
of  conveying ethical content (both as a “material” posture towards 
human action and as a strategy for reading the book). It is by 
means of  this dialectic that the reader manages not only to un-
derstand her place on the plane of  reasons embodied by Dia-
ry of  a Bad Year – becoming aware that she is an integral part 
of  this space and not a mere spectator – but also to replace 
substitute ethical thought (the only kind available to any reader 
who merely occupies the position of  spectator) with a straight-
forward but difficult ethical attitude: a commitment to decide 
how she should live and behave, given the shame that is hers ab 
initio – maybe because she is American, most likely because she 
is human.
But why did Coetzee feel compelled to use JC to morally ed-
ucate his readers, while refusing to reveal his precise relation 
to this character and to his views? Isn’t this, after all, a sheer 
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abuse of  well-known rhetorical devices? In other words, isn’t he 
as shameless as any liberal intellectual? 
6. Unveiled methodology
Admittedly, we may not ultimately settle on the interpretation 
of  Diary I have been offering here; it is, after all, just one of  
many possible approaches to Coetzee’s work, with its own po-
tential shortcomings (for which I alone am responsible). With 
this said, however, two points in particular have thus far become 
apparent: both in the sections that Coetzee wants to attribute to 
JC and in the lower sections of  the page that he doesn’t mind 
presenting as his own, Coetzee’s writing style is extremely clear, 
descriptive and neat. Indeed, he must avoid obscurity and lin-
guistic excess if  he wants the narrative to progress through the 
different sections of  the book’s pages, to preserve the important 
connections between them, and to hold the reader’s attention. 
On the other hand, the narrative device of  a split in the author’s 
voice instantiates a gap with regard to the identity of  the novel’s 
author at the very outset. The graphic structure of  the book’s 
page is of  course highly unconventional, and both it and the 
related identity split between JC and John Coetzee are features 
that the reader confronts from the moment she takes up the 
novel. Philosophers are drawn to Coetzee’s texts in part because 
of  their complexity and the stylistic puzzles they contain. My 
own reading of  Diary, whether or not it is ultimately helpful, can 
be viewed as a response to its ostensibly puzzling rhetorical fea-
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tures. The complexity of  this interpretation directly reflects the 
complexity of  the book’s structure – an enticement with which 
Coetzee subtly provokes philosophical engagement.   
Contemporary philosophers describe John Coetzee’s work as 
“modernist realist” (see Mulhall, 2009), both because of  its 
systematic formal features and because of  the careful meta-re-
flection on the historical evolution of  literary realism and mod-
ernism that some of  his works explicitly contain.10 Such philos-
ophers go even further when they argue that a parallel struggle 
between realism and modernism, in terms of  both technique 
and the corresponding impact on thematic issues, is intrinsic 
both to the realist design of  the novel since its inception (citing 
either Cervantes or the pioneering English realism of  Daniel 
Defoe) and to the realist efforts of  modern philosophy. Mulhall 
has the following to say about this dialectic in relation to the 
genre of  the novel:
The history of  the novel since Defoe, Richardson and Sterne 
might therefore be written entirely in terms of  the ways in 
which novelists repeatedly subject their inheritance of  realistic 
conventions to critical questioning in order to recreate the im-
pression of  reality in their readers (in large part by encouraging 
those readers to see prior uses of  convention to represent the 
real as merely conventional in contrast with their own, far more 
convincing ones). […] [I]t is not simply that the novel has a 
10  See, for instance, J. M. Coetzee’s modernist reflection on main features 
of  formal realism in Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons, Secker and Warburg, Lon-
don 2003, 4.
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cannibalistic relation to other literary genres; from the outset, its 
practitioners had a similarly Oedipal relation to prior examples 
within the genre of  the novel, and so to the prior conventions 
within which they necessarily operated (Mulhall, 2009: 145).
In The Wounded Animal,11 Mulhall elaborates on the same kind 
of  Oedipal struggle we encounter in the founding projects of  
modern philosophy – including those undertaken by Descartes, 
Locke and Berkeley – and their spectacular fight against argu-
ments of  authority, from both philosophy and religion. 
Following this thread, and having presented the dialectic of  
responsibility in Diary of  a Bad Year (along with one possible 
explanation for the tripartite structure of  the book’s pages), I 
must now apply the results of  my own inquiry to philosophy – 
so that my own effort doesn’t merely collapse into yet another 
case of  the imposition of  a dry philosophical framework on a 
remarkable piece of  contemporary literature, and thus the de-
struction of  the latter’s original vitality. The crucial issue at this 
point can be put thus: recent philosophical projects have turned 
to specific literary achievements – like Coetzee’s – and found 
that they have such-and-such to say about them. But who, then, 
in turn examines these philosophical commentaries on works 
of  literature? Writers like Coetzee tend to be extremely critical 
when they do so (as our consideration of  Strong Opinions shows). 
Is there, perhaps, a more genial approach available to us?   
11  S. mulhall, The Wounded Animal: J. M. Coetzee and the Difficulty of  Reality in 
Literature and Philosophy, Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford 2009, 
Print (esp. chap. Nine).
26
A
is
th
em
a,
 In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 J
ou
rn
al
  V
ol
. I
I (
20
15
),
 fa
sc
ic
ol
o 
2
W
W
W
.A
IS
T
H
E
M
A
.E
U
A. Falcato
7. A third contributor
A further important source for this resumed conversation be-
tween (contemporary) literature and (contemporary) philosophy 
– neglected thus far – is literary criticism12. In his 2005 study, 
The English Novel: An Introduction,13 Terry Eagleton (whose critical 
standpoint is distinctly Marxist) insists that it was the extraor-
dinary rise of  the middle class throughout eighteenth-century 
Europe that, via a narrative mirroring of  its social struggles 
and aspirations, paved the way for the realist novel. Eagleton 
grounds his critical reading of  canonical English-language 
novels, reaching from the work of  Daniel Defoe to that of  Vir-
ginia Woolf  (the book not only argues for an historical model 
for interpreting the evolution of  the genre, but also follows the 
historical evolution of  the canon), on an essentially sociological 
model, arguing that the ascending middle class can be char-
acterized as the great protagonist of  the liberal values of  indi-
vidual self-determination and prosperity, unwilling to stand for 
romantic myths and general abstractions, and that its most rep-
resentative writers projected the main values defended by the 
class to which they belong. For Eagleton, then, the realistic prose 
of  most eighteenth-century literature both mirrors and embod-
ies the pragmatic values of  a new social order. If  we accept that 
12  Coetzee himself  is an outstanding and well-known literary critic, of  cour-
se (see, e.g. his Inner Workings, Vintage, London 2008). We have been focusing 
here only in his literary works.
13  T. eagleton, The English Novel: An Introduction, Blackwell, Oxford 2005, 
Print.
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the purpose of  the realistic novel is to do justice to the facts, to 
life as it stands in this new social configuration, we must also as-
sume that this social mirroring, arguably accomplished through 
an inevitably conventional medium – a natural language – is 
the true purpose of  realistic prose. The linguistic convention 
that makes narrative possible is thus an essentially phenomenal 
device, in the sense that it allows for the linguistic manifestation 
of  the (socially relevant) facts as they stand. 
Both in the introduction to his study “What is a Novel” and in 
his critical discussion of  the canon, Eagleton relies on a socio-di-
alectical model to explain literary formal realism. According to 
this stance, the realistic, self-effacing style of  the eighteenth-cen-
tury English novel is as much a product of  the contemporary 
liberal social order as the modernistic turn of  the early twen-
tieth century is a product of  the social and political disasters 
that resulted in the Holocaust. To Eagleton, if  the novel does 
indeed have representative potential, so does the social order 
whose essentially evolutionary dialectic can also be depicted by 
conventional linguistic means. 
By contrast, Stephen Mulhall (in two chapters in The Wounded 
Animal14 and two essays in The Self  and its Shadows15) considers 
the tension between realism and modernism in the work of  
John Coetzee, detecting in the latter’s working out of  the mod-
14  mulhall, 2009: Chapters Nine and Ten.
15  S. Mulhall, The Self  and Its Shadows: A Book of  Essays on Individuality as Nega-
tion in Philosophy and the Arts, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, Print (“The 
Melodramatic Reality of  Film and Literature” and “Countering the Ballad of  
Co-Dependency”).
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ernistic-realist tension we’ve analysed above what I will term 
a “conventionalist” pattern of  self-overcoming with regard to 
inherited literary styles. 
At the risk of  oversimplifying Mulhall’s dense account of  mod-
ernist realism in the contemporary novel (which will serve my 
own purposes below), I want to describe his proposal as follows. 
He insists on the existence of  an inner and inevitably doomed 
struggle within literary prose itself, present since the very in-
ception of  the novel, arguing that the novel has been struggling 
against its own conventional status as a genre in the name of  
fidelity to the facts. However, since these supposed facts are 
themselves a product of  the literary imagination (and since, as 
linguistic creations, they are particularly “conventional”), the re-
alistic novel is logically doomed to inflict on its descendants the 
same Oedipal tension it inherited from its ancestors (this is the 
material point of  his quotation above). 
Now, this dialectic of  self-overcoming is made all the more acute 
by a progressive awareness within the modernist tradition of  the 
fact that the methodological design of  formal realism can only 
be accomplished through a means of  expression that is highly 
conventional or non-natural – a means that must be acknowledged 
as such. (According to this proposal, Coetzee’s literary project, 
not least because he is also an outstanding critic, inherits this 
self-conscious historical design.)
The potential for reflection afforded by the insurmountable bar-
rier separating the realistic writer from the factual world that his 
prose intends to represent provides a path for awareness of  the 
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facticity of  the prose itself  and for reflection, through that very 
prose, on both its representative potential and its representative 
limits. This in turn calls for a reflective fold within the prose 
itself  in what concerns the conditions of  its own possibility as a 
(conventional) representative device – something we’ve seen ex-
emplified in Coetzee’s modernistic approach to his own literary 
project, e.g. by reflecting on the conditions of  the composition 
of  Strong Opinions as an element within Diary.
By the time this turning-in-upon-itself  on the part of  literary 
prose is finally explored systematically from within the bounds 
of  literature, we encounter modernism scholars arguing that: 
Typical aspects […] of  “modernist” writing are radical aesthet-
ics, technical experimentation, spatial or rhythmic rather than 
chronological form, self-conscious reflexiveness, skepticism to-
wards the idea of  a centered human subject and a sustained 
inquiry into the uncertainty of  reality. […] Modernism [was 
thus] concerned with self-referentiality, producing art that was 
about itself  and texts that were self-contained rather than repre-
sentational. (Childs, 2008: 19)16 
We also encounter (historically minded) modernist realist writ-
ers like Coetzee, reflecting on the tradition he inherited within 
a novel of  his own:
The blue costume, the greasy hair, are details, signs of  moder-
ate realism. Supply the particulars, allow the significations to 
emerge of  themselves. A procedure pioneered by Daniel Defoe. 
Robinson Crusoe, cast up on the beach, looks around for his 
16  P. ChilDS, Modernism, Routledge, London/New York 20082, Print.
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shipmates. But there are none. “I never saw them afterwards, or 
any sign of  them”, says he, “except three of  their hats, one cap, 
and two shoes that were not fellows”. Two shoes, not fellows: 
by not being fellows, the shoes have ceased to be footwear and 
become proofs of  death, torn by the foaming seas off the feet of  
drowning men and tossed ashore. No large words, no despair, 
just hats and caps and shoes.  (Elizabeth Costello, 2003: 4)
At this point, we should already also know what philosophers 
themselves have to say about these historical tensions, both in 
the (finally) fellow subject of  literature and within philosophy 
itself. But do we really?
8. Self-subverting models: are we left without a theory?
What have we accomplished thus far? We began by mention-
ing an ongoing conversation between philosophers and writers 
(especially novelists) that seems to rescue the latter from Plato’s 
exile (it is also important to stress here that this is mainly a phil-
osophical worry, since the poets were never greatly concerned 
about their ostracism from philosophy). We then analysed an 
extremely concrete contemporary discussion of  two issues that 
were raised by Plato as (philosophical) obstacles against the po-
ets: namely, the worry that poetry, due to its idolatrous charac-
ter, leads us away from virtue, and that an excessive focus on 
images addresses only the appetitive part of  the soul, leaving 
our rational faculty hungry for argument. As it happens, John 
Coetzee seems to turn these worries upside-down (in Diary of  a 
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Bad Year and elsewhere), putting both (platonic) charges to the 
philosopher himself  and working his way out of  a rationalistic trap 
by paying close attention to the work’s form, in addition to both creating an 
alter-ego who plays along with it and imposing himself  as the author of  
a larger book, which finally frees him from the bonds of  mere argument by 
incorporating argument and presenting it as essentially defective. But then, 
one question still remains: who reads John Coetzee and tackles 
his therapeutic aims, in part by showing that she has been cured 
of  the argumentative blindness he diagnoses? In other words, 
is it possible for Coetzee’s charges against philosophy to be not 
only answered but even incorporated into a new way of  doing 
philosophy? I have implied that the answer is yes, but I haven’t 
yet said how this might be so. 
One of  the things that ought to be highlighted once again is 
that Coetzee himself  writes his novels (and voices its charges) in 
a specific way: his style is sober, compact and self-conscious, all at 
once. Furthermore, he reflects on the peculiarities of  (his own 
and others’) literary styles, and, partly because of  this incorpo-
rated self-reflection, his novels belong to what philosophers like 
Mulhall have termed “modernist realism”. How can we account 
for that – that is, for our claim, as philosophers, that Coetzee is a 
modernist realist writer? 
In the preceding section, I presented a two-pronged reading of  
the evolution of  realism and modernism in the history of  the 
novel, thereby generating a fiction of  my own about the sort 
of  literary prose that aims to represent invented stories about 
made up characters whilst doing justice to social and psycho-
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logical reality. I gave names to the two explanatory models that 
account for the realism/modernism dialectic in the history of  
the novel, arguing that, whereas Eagleton’s model is essential-
ly socio-dialectical, Mulhall’s account emphasizes a conscious 
self-overcoming of  the constraints provided by literary conven-
tions. And now I want to say that, in truth, neither of  the two 
models functions exclusively of  the other as a means of  captur-
ing the true nature of  the development of  literary realism and 
the turn to modernism – nor, for that matter, can either of  them 
account for the sort of  modernistic critical framing of  an inter-
nal realistic project that we encounter in Diary. 
Even if, with Eagleton, we accept as our starting point the his-
torical emergence of  the European middle class from the eigh-
teenth century onwards, the shattering events of  the twentieth 
century (not least South African Apartheid) are such that the his-
torical developments emphasized in the socio-economic model 
come to be reflected in precisely the struggle against inherited 
conventions emphasized by the “conventionalist” approach out-
lined above. Given the unique and devastating nature of  the 
historical realities in question, reflection on one element cannot 
be undertaken in isolation of  careful reflection on the other. 
And thus no sociological model that can account for the mod-
ernistic turn in the European novel in the last decade of  the 
nineteenth century can dispense with Oedipal struggles within 
and against literary conventions that have become either in-
complete or totally obsolete as a means of  representing reality 
as it truly stands. As the relevant social developments themselves 
33
A
isth
em
a, In
tern
ation
al Jou
rn
al  Vol. II (20
15
), fascicolo 2
W
W
W
.A
IS
T
H
E
M
A
.E
U
Modernist Realism and its Enemies: John Coetzee and Philosophy
come to be characterized by a breakdown in structure, unity 
and value, their representation becomes inseparable from a 
struggle against increasingly inadequate conventions – the odd 
structure of  the page in Coetzee’s Diary bearing witness to this 
inadequacy. 
To my analysis of  the split page we should also add a consid-
eration of  the remarkable methodological differences between 
the voices of  JC and John Coetzee in Diary of  a Bad Year, played 
out by the latter as part of  his therapeutic induction of  read-
ers of  his book. The passages from both Strong Opinions and the 
lower sections that Anya encourages JC to call “soft opinions” 
cited above attest to a genuine difference of  tone with regard 
to each voice. JC’s writing is as informative and opinionated 
as a thematic essay can be, and he never allows his reasoning 
to deviate from a clear argumentative pattern. Strong Opinions is 
rightly described as a realistic report on contemporary ethical and 
political issues. In the lower sections of  the page – where we also 
read how the upper sections were produced – Coetzee departs 
from straightforward reasoning, allowing for suspensions, ono-
matopoeia and markedly emotive language. It seems likely that 
Coetzee wants his readers to realize that and how a maximally 
comprehensive literary achievement cannot rely merely on the 
politically realistic prose characteristic of  JC’s voice. The way 
Coetzee shows us this, as we’ve seen, is via a modernistic embed-
ding of  Strong Opinions within his own book. 
But then, if  that embedding is one of  the key features of  this 
modernist realist literary project at this stage of  its evolution (we 
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know that it has evolved further in the meantime), and if  one 
of  the practical outcomes of  this manoeuvre is the dialectic of  
responsibility and its unveiling of  the truth about the status of  
Diary’s reader by refusing to feed him a straightforward argu-
mentative treatise like Strong Opinions alone – precisely because, 
as we’ve seen, it cannot do the job it is intended to do – how can 
an explanatory essay on Diary of  a Bad Year and its modernistic 
refinement possibly escape the fate of  ersatz ethical thought? 
What I want to say is: how can a plausible theory of  ersatz eth-
ical thought avoid collapsing into mere ersatz thought itself, 
where such failure is attributable in part to its very plausibility 
and persuasiveness? After all, the discovery of  a good explana-
tory model usually provides us with a grounded excuse to stop 
thinking about the topic it explains. We assume that we know, 
and we proceed from there. As we’ve seen, by Coetzee’s lights, 
both the theory and our acceptance of  it are forms of  substi-
tution ethical thought. Thus we might suspect that this paper 
should itself  have been written in three layers, to the degree that 
its aim was to prevent ersatz ethical thought. But then, what 
would have been the point of  writing it, other than to re-phrase 
Diary of  a Bad Year, re-composing it in other words and perhaps 
damaging the original’s reputation? 
Is there anything left for us to do when the target of  our inquiry, 
with which we are directly confronted, throws itself  back upon 
us? Perhaps we should look more closely at how philosophers 
have dealt with the traps left by novelists they do not want to 
expel from their citadel again – such as Coetzee. 
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Mulhall is a case in point. Both in The Wounded Animal – especial-
ly in those chapters that most insist upon the dangerous overlap-
ping of  the literary identities of  Costello and Coetzee – and in 
the more recent “Countering the Ballad of  Co-dependency”, 
he explores various possibilities for staging or performing the liter-
ary encounter between realism and modernism in the story of  
Elizabeth Costello, displayed in the novel of  the same name (it 
is now evident that, and how, the same can be done for Diary). 
But that staging isn’t merely theoretical, if  only because Mul-
hall’s philosophical prose embodies what it stands for, thus con-
stituting another plausible candidate for a defeat of  ersatz ethi-
cal thought. (Because his approach doesn’t duplicate Coetzee’s 
ways, it can, at least on the face of  it, be set free of  the charge of  
involving an inconsistent – or desperate – appeal to the authori-
ty of  the writer, which would have rendered him irresponsible in 
just the way that the liberal intellectual is irresponsible.) 
Mulhall chose to focus on Elizabeth Costello. Readers of  this book, 
Mulhall claims, are introduced to events that take place both in 
the protagonist’s academic life and in her everyday family life 
– both of  which happen to be products of  Coetzee’s literary 
imagination, as are Diary, Strong Opinions and JC. Reading Eliz-
abeth Costello, we learn about the protagonist’s physical decay, 
which contrasts sharply with the prodigiousness of  her literary 
imagination and the playful recreation of  the history of  the nov-
el that she provides in The House on Eccles Street (a novel by Costel-
lo to which we have no access whatever), in the Gates Lecture 
at Appleton College, and in private conversation with John, her 
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son. In the course of  her lecture at Appleton College, Costello 
even tackles the meaning of  Kafka’s “Report to an Academy”, 
whose strange narrative starting point (an ape talking to a hu-
man audience) perhaps resembles her own situation in deliver-
ing the Gates Lecture. 
The set of  episodes in Costello’s life brought together by Coet-
zee in a novel published several years after their individual pre-
sentation as lectures17 does not present us with a theory about 
the (realistic) evolution of  formal realism up to the modernistic 
turn (just as the modernistic performance of  embedding one 
realistic book – Strong Opinions – within a larger one and toying 
with the names of  their respective authors does not constitute a 
theory about the evolution of  these formal techniques, or even 
about the evolution of  both books as instances of  each). Rather, 
the book stages or performs this evolution, in part by including 
reports on unexpected events during Costello’s visit to Apple-
ton College and to John’s family. What happens during this vis-
it (both the lectures and the meetings they occasion), provides 
the raw material for a realistic novel which, in a modernistic 
fashion, reflects both upon its own conditions of  possibility and 
development as a specimen of  the genre and upon the historical 
evolution of  the latter. Elizabeth Costello is precisely this novel, 
and Mulhall, in his reading of  it and the modernistic turn it 
instantiates, chooses to bring neither its story nor the puzzle of  
17  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Princeton University in 
1997, under the title “The Lives of  Animals” and published in 1999 (J. M. Co-
etzee, The Lives of  Animals, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1999).
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the identity of  its author and narrator into a scholarly frame. In-
stead, and battling against the standards relied upon by his own 
analytic-philosophical tradition, he does justice to the literary 
and philosophical aspects of  both (story and puzzle) by giving 
them a voice in his own reading – itself  an example of  the in-
terdisciplinary conversation between philosophy and literature 
I have been tracing, which becomes possible when traditional, 
discipline-specific strictures are loosened. In precisely this way, 
and much like Coetzee’s, his own work represents a critical re-
sponse to traditional philosophical modes of  investigation, and 
thus also an Oedipal overcoming of  a widely accepted meth-
odological inheritance. Contrary to what occurs with regard 
to Coetzee-the-writer, however, this way of  doing philosophy 
is polemic and faces several kinds of  Platonic critic. It does re-
ply to Coetzee’s challenge, though, and without replicating its 
form – which is crucial to its avoiding the descent into ersatz 
ethical thought. With this important development noted, what 
this open-ended inquiry would still seem to require is a similarly 
therapeutic critique of  the literary critic – and indeed of  the 
tentative reflections offered here. 
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